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Abstract. C. S. Peirce once described philosophical rhetoric as “the highest and most 
living branch of logic”. Th is article outlines a new interpretation of what prompted 
this unexpected elevation of the third subdivision of semiotic (understood as logic 
in the broad sense), and explores some of the implications of the proposed reading. 
Two plausible explanations are identifi ed, leading to an exposition of Peirce’s equally 
puzzling association of rhetoric with objective logic in the 1890s. Th e fi nal part of the 
essay briefl y addresses the question of how Peirce’s subsequent shift  from rhetoric to 
methodeutic may have aff ected his conception of the concluding branch of logic.
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In some striking passages, C. S. Peirce describes pure or speculative rhetoric as “the 
highest and most living branch of logic” (CP 2.333, c. 1895–1896),1 a department of 
inquiry “destined to grow into a colossal doctrine which may be expected to lead to 
most important philosophical conclusions” (CP 3.454, 1896). However, aft er a review of 
Peirce’s seminal work in logic and semiotic it is diffi  cult not to regard these statements 
as rather hyperbolic. Even if it were granted that this conception of rhetoric includes 
1  Th is quote stems from a manuscript that has been scattered around the nachlass and the 
Collected Papers. Th e dating is uncertain. However, in one fragment (MS 805), Peirce refers to a 
paper on his table, where the phrase “some questions were asked the junior class in psychology 
in Columbia College in March 1893” occurs. Th is is most likely a reference to J. McKeen 
Cattell’s “Measurements of the accuracy of recollection” (Science, Dec 6, 1895), where, but for 
the omission of the word “were”, this exact sentence can be found. Th is, in addition to the fact 
that the manuscript in question deals with certain topics in Ernst Schröder’s algebraic logic, 
shows that it was most likely written in late 1895 or early 1896. Although this may look like 
a rather pedantic concern with relatively insignifi cant details, the dating of the texts under 
scrutiny is of interest for getting to the bottom of the issues to be discussed in this article.
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pragmatistic clarifi cation of meaning in addition to some other prominent Peircean 
interests, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the proper place of the third branch in 
his hierarchy of inquiries lies beneath its siblings – that is, below speculative grammar 
and critic, two subdivisions of semiotic logic to which he paid far more systematic 
attention than to the rather scrappy fi eld of speculative-rhetorical inquiry.  
Is Peirce’s elevation of rhetoric to the pinnacles of logic then merely a polemical 
exaggeration, if not a case of momentary derangement? In this article, I will sketch 
a new interpretation of what the self-professed “exact logician” may have had in 
mind when making such puzzling claims. Th e answer – which will be revealed in the 
course of the discussion – may have been hidden in plain sight, so to speak, basically 
overlooked by all of the scholars that have taken an interest in Peirce’s speculative 
rhetoric and the broader questions of the semiotic trivium. 
Th ere are at least three reasons why the almost obvious solution – if not the fact 
that there is an interesting question here to begin with – has been ignored by readers 
of Peirce, myself included. Firstly, Peirce’s laudatory remarks regarding rhetoric occur 
in the middle of a phase – roughly, 1893–1898 – when he was resuming his youthful 
interest in the theory of signs aft er a longish hiatus.2 So far, nobody has tried to piece 
together a detailed chronological account of this relatively short period from this 
point of view; but once that is done, some overlooked patterns do begin to emerge. 
Secondly, Peirce’s remarks on rhetoric are admittedly few and scattered, and hardly 
seem to delineate anything like a clear-cut scientifi c discipline or an immense doctrine. 
However, as we shall see, some of his ostensibly cryptic remarks do suggest a rather 
far-reaching creed – which, of course, does not automatically guarantee that the ideas 
behind it are plausible or worth pursuing. Th at, indeed, may be linked to the third 
possible explanation: the fact that Peirce, not long aft er elevating speculative rhetoric 
to unexpected heights, appears to abandon it for methodeutic – or at least shift s his 
attention toward narrower but better focused issues of methodology. Th us, in the 
concluding part of this essay, I will briefl y consider what happens to the highest branch 
of logic in the wake of the methodeutic makeover.
Hypothesis I: Scientifi c contributions
Peirce initially introduces his trivium of semiotic inquiries as a set of specializations 
of the study of symbols – or “symbolistic” – in the mid-1860s. In “On a new list of 
2 Here, I use a rather simple criterion for determining what belongs to semiotic, limiting 
myself to clear references to the sign-theoretical trivium and ignoring the question of the 
possible semiotic character of logical and pragmatic issues not plainly treated within such a 
frame. A fuller account of the vicissitudes of Peirce’s theory of signs would have to take a 
broader view, but for the limited aims of this article, the narrower perspective arguably suffi  ces.
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categories” (1867), rhetoric is defi ned as a science treating “the formal conditions of 
the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference 
in general to interpretants” (W 2: 57). Th at established, references to this branch of 
scientifi c inquiry basically vanish from Peirce’s writings for more than twenty years. 
Th ey return, initially without much ado, in the fi rst half of the 1890s. As far as I have 
been able to make out, the occasion of the reoccurrence is one of Peirce’s ill-fated 
attempts to produce a comprehensive presentation of his logic – or rather, the series 
of interconnected book projects variously designated as Th e Art of Reasoning, How to 
Reason, and Th e Grand Logic.
In any case, in a prospective chapter on “Th e logic of quantity”, Peirce inserts 
what at fi rst blush appears to be a minor parenthetic remark regarding his tendency 
to stress “balance and symmetry in logic” (CP 4.116, 18943). He notes that such factors 
are highly relevant in the art of reasoning, but he does not concede that they would 
be strictly speaking required by the science under scrutiny. Still, he connects these 
refl ections with his old conception of rhetoric as a study of the force of symbols, adding 
that “the Grundsatz of Formal Rhetoric is that an idea should be presented in a unitary, 
comprehensive, systematic shape” (CP 4.116, 1894). Th is he proceeds to explicate in 
terms of how a mathematician reveals an underlying intelligible order by adding 
elements to a diagram that at fi rst appears incomprehensible because of the complexity 
of its components (in this case, lines). Peirce designates such a regularity-revealing 
enlargement of a system “the prime principle of the rhetoric of self-communing” (CP 
4.116, 1894). In a more specifi c example, he then shows how this rhetorical rule might 
be applied to the concept of infi nity, illustrating the way in which the mathematician 
can supplement facts “in the interest of formal rhetoric” (CP 4.117, 1894).
Although seemingly far removed from the traditional rhetorical interests 
in persuasion and the art of discourse, these sparse remarks on the rhetoric of 
mathematics do involve a focus on the expressive power of signs – here ostensibly 
limited to symbols, but later typically discussed in terms of iconicity – that implies 
one possible explanation for Peirce’s newfound appreciation for rhetoric. In the 
passages mentioned, he draws rhetorical lessons from the purported practices of 
the mathematician, possibly also anticipating some later suggestions concerning 
the methodeutic of theorematic reasoning and “the heuretic part of mathematical 
procedure” (NEM 4: 49, 1902; NEM 4: 46, 1902).4 At any rate, from this perspective, 
3 Th is manuscript (MS 423) has been dated 1893 in Th e Collected Papers and the catalogue 
compiled by Richard Robin. However, based on some in-text-references, it was actually 
composed in 1894, something that Peirce corroborates in a letter to F. C. Russell (MS L387, 
Oct 7, 1895). 
4 Th at such considerations have at least something to do with Peirce’s recovery of rhetoric 
is also suggested in the earlier “On the algebra of logic” (subtitled “A contribution to the 
philosophy of notation”), where he expresses the hope that his eff orts “may prove a fi rst step 
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Peirce’s persistent highlighting of issues related to notation would be a primarily 
rhetorical concern. It is a thread running through much of his thought, formal logic 
and mathematics included. 
Also, as the proposed leading principle or primary rule of rhetoric is something 
purportedly applicable in and to other forms of inquiry, these refl ections seem to point 
toward certain methodological concerns. In a more normative tone, the somewhat later 
Short Logic (1895) characterizes speculative rhetoric as “the general foundation of the art 
of putting propositions into eff ective forms”, and associates it with the endorsement of 
“forms of thinking as will most economically serve the purpose of Reason” (EP 2: 19). 
Here, one may discern the emergence of the notion that the art of expression is to be 
preceded or backed up by a science concerned with its principles, in addition to a nod to 
the economy of research. Th is scientifi c or disciplinary justifi cation for the recovery of 
speculative rhetoric seems to be upheld in “Th e regenerated logic” (1896), where Peirce 
defi nes the core task of the third branch as “the study of those general conditions under 
which a problem presents itself for solution and those under which one question leads 
on to another” (CP 3.430), as well as in “Th at Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions 
are one in essence, with some connected matters” (c. 1895–6), in which he argues for the 
need of a third branch of logic by appealing to the very nature of scientifi c inquiry itself.
Science is a living process and not a fi xed result. Consequently, it is not suffi  cient 
to fi nd the general conditions of the truth of a representation. It is necessary 
further to study the laws of the development of scientifi c representations. I have 
named this study, rather fancifully, speculative rhetoric, for the sake of utilizing 
a well-known trivium, or triad of names for sciences, and also to signify what it 
seems to me must be the main problem of this third logical branch, namely the 
infl uence of one thought upon another thought. (MS 787:11 (c. 1895–1896))
Th us, with logic in the broad sense characterized not only as semiotic (CP 1.444, 
c. 1896), but also as the science of what is “universally true respecting scientifi c 
representations” (MS S64), rhetoric would appear to have found its niche in a 
classifi catory framework where “the general order of study” is given hierarchically as 
mathematics → logic → metaphysics → the special sciences (MS 787s: 7, c. 1895–1896).5 
As a part of “exact logic”, rhetoric seems to have been assigned the signifi cant task 
of unearthing laws of scientifi c representation or sign use. Consequently, given that 
“Categorical and hypothetical propositions” also happens to be the source of the passage 
promoting speculative rhetoric to the uppermost echelons of logic, we would seem to 
toward the resolution of one of the main problems of logic, that of producing a method for the 
discovery of methods in mathematics” (W 5:166, 1885). Notably, he also discusses “second-
intentional logic” in this context.
5 At this stage, Peirce’s conception of philosophy includes only two broad divisions, those of 
logic and metaphysics.
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have arrived at a rather plausible answer to our primary question: it is the distinctive 
service that rhetorical investigation is supposed to render for the advancement of science 
that warrants the talk about rhetoric being the highest branch of logic. 
One fairly obvious, but perhaps not decisive, counterargument to this account relates 
to the actual position of speculative rhetoric in Peirce’s classifi cation of the sciences. 
Clearly, the third branch is not the “highest” in this respect; rhetoric is actually portrayed 
as reliant on the more abstract logical departments of grammar and critic. It is perhaps 
not self-evident that Peirce’s schematic arrangements should be given this much weight, 
as they are oft en viewed as retrospective exercises of the science of review (see, e.g., EP 
2: 258–259, 1903; MS 601: 26, c. 1906). However, the fact is that the Comtean principle 
of dependence, which determines the non-reciprocal organization of the classifi cation, 
also informs Peirce’s conception of science at a fundamental level, beginning with the 
antecedence of theoretical or heuretic inquiry over practical sciences or arts. In response, 
it could be argued that the unexpected elevation of rhetoric may have been something of 
an exaggeration, but that it is nonetheless attributable to the growing stature of rhetoric 
in Peirce’s conception of scientifi c inquiry. 
However, a closer look at the setting in which Peirce refers to speculative rhetoric 
as the topmost subdivision of logic complicates the picture. Th e sudden bolstering of 
the third branch in “Categorical and hypothetical propositions” and the anticipation 
of a colossal doctrine in “Th e regenerated logic” are actually triggered by Peirce’s 
critical refl ections on Schröder’s Algebra der Logik (1895). In spite of the intellectual 
kinship between the two logicians, there are aspects of Schröder’s algebra that Peirce 
fi nds profoundly problematic. He is troubled by what he perceives to be the German 
logician’s loose practices of notation and attribution (see, e.g., MS 520). Peirce also 
has some qualms about the overly formalistic penchant of his fellow-traveller in the 
world of relatives – producing “too many bushels of chaff  per grain of wheat”, as he 
metaphorically puts it (CP 3.451, 1896) – and he expresses some concern regarding an 
apparent lack of interest for the broader applications of the new logic (MS L387, Oct 4, 
1895). Yet, in Schröder’s recognition of the value of “rhetorical evidence” – which Peirce 
interprets as the thesis that “we can directly observe what is familiar to our experience 
of assertions and seems to be inseparable from them” (CP 2.333, c. 1895–1896)6 – he 
detects a standpoint broadly in harmony with his awakening rhetoric.
6 Peirce does not provide a reference to Algebra der Logik. Perhaps committing a minor 
violation of ethics of terminology, Peirce’s use of “rhetorical evidence” does not seem to fully 
accord with the way the term is employed by Schröder, by whom it is contrasted to analytical and 
geometrical evidence (see Schröder, 1895: 64-5). However, in the contention that “[die] dritte 
Art von Evidenz, die rhetorische, ist die im gewöhnlichen Denken wirksame” (Schröder 1895: 
66), one can arguably detect certain similarities with Peirce’s notion of common experience 
(see, e.g., CP 8.112, c. 1900). More boldly, one could surmise that it is not a coincidence that 
Peirce’s conception of philosophy as a study of everyday or ordinary experience also emerges – 
or at least receives a considerable boost – during this period (see, e.g., NEM 4: 273, c. 1895; MS 
787: 5, c. 1895–1896). 
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At fi rst blush, Peirce’s affi  rmation of rhetorical evidence might not seem to amount 
to much more than a profession of the need for experiential testing of certain results 
obtained by purely theoretical means. As he argues that basic logical analysis – here 
portrayed as a scrutiny of assertion7 – needs to employ two kinds of reasoning, we 
seem to be presented with a fairly standard picture of a deductive or “systematical” 
derivation of “quasi-predictions”, followed by an inductive phase in which we “turn 
to the rhetorical evidence and see whether or not they are verifi ed by observation” 
(CP 2.333, c. 1895–1896) – that is, a basic anti-Baconian division into a priori and a 
posteriori stages of reasoning (cf. EP 2: 289, 1903). However, Peirce actually maintains 
that the systematical phase entails a deduction of “what the constituents of assertion 
must be from the theory […] that truth consists in the defi nitive compulsion of the 
investigating intelligence” (EP 2: 289, 1903). Th e twist to this story is that the turn to 
rhetorical evidence also entails a return to the very sources of an “already accepted 
proximate analysis of evidence”, from which the minute analysis of assertion proceeds 
(MS 805: 18, c. 1895–6; MS 787: 12, c. 1895–1896). Put diff erently, the starting point 
is what one could imprecisely call “rhetorical raw materials”: the initial, uncritical 
recognition of ingredients of the logica utens, such as characteristics of doubt, belief, 
and other compulsions on “scientifi c intelligence”8 (cf. MS 787: 12–15, c. 1895–1896).9 
Th is could perhaps be characterized as an abductive-rhetorical phase in the course 
of logical investigation.
Granted, all this seems to pertain more to an informal reconstruction of the general 
process of inquiry – not too far from the well-known picture painted in “Th e fi xation 
7 Later, Peirce will introduce a sharper distinction between a proposition – or eventually, in 
more precise semiotic terms, dicent – and its assertion, with the latter taking on a somewhat 
secondary pragmatic role (see, e.g., MS 599: 6, c. 1902; CP 5.543, c. 1903; SS 34, 1904; CP 8.313, 
1905).
8 By ‘scientifi c intelligence’, Peirce does not mean to suggest scientifi c activity of the developed 
disciplinary variety; the term actually refers to “an intelligence that needs to learn and can learn 
(provided that there be anything for it to learn) from experience (MS 787s: 6–7, c. 1895–1896; 
cf. CP 2.227, c. 1897). It is not necessarily human. Similarly, “scientifi c representations” are 
not scientifi c propositions in a narrow sense, but rather representations that are capable of 
embodying “knowledge acquired by intellectual operations upon experience” (MS 787:10, c. 
1895–1896).
9 Admittedly, this reconstruction goes beyond Peirce, and seems to clash with certain other 
aspects of his programme. However, the proposed reading accords with his later contention 
that philosophical analysis must not “begin by talking of pure ideas, – vagabond thoughts 
that tramp the public roads without any human habitation, – but must begin with men and 
their conversation” (CP 8.112, c. 1900). Something similar can also be detected in Peirce’s 
“derivation” of the basic components of the sign relation from the functions of ordinary 
utterance and interpretation (see EP 2: 403–410, 1907). In these cases, the logica utens might 
almost as well be called the rhetorica utens.
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of belief” (1877) – than to a truly systematic account based on logical precedence 
and principle-dependence. However, that is partly the point; since we are trying to 
fathom why Peirce refers to rhetoric as the highest branch of logic, to merely register 
its relatively subordinate position in relation to grammar and critic can hardly be the 
answer – especially as many of the texts under scrutiny also present prototypes of the 
hierarchical schemes more familiar from the writings of the 1900s. Still, while the 
Schröder-induced recognition of the signifi cance of rhetorical evidence may have been 
one infl uence on Peirce’s endorsement of speculative rhetoric, this hardly suggests the 
advent of a “colossal doctrine” with far-reaching philosophical implications. At heart, 
the polemical edge of his argument is directed against narrow formalism. In another 
unexpected turn of events, Peirce ends up extolling rhetorical evidence because of 
its formal defi ciency, and he declares that its “essential and ineluctable imperfection 
measures the depth and truth of the method which sinks its plummet beyond those 
superfi cial parts of the mind which are alone susceptible of exact defi nition” (MS 
805: 18, c. 1895–1896; cf. CP 2.333, c. 1895–1896) – something that strengthens 
the impression that he is not talking about mere inductive testing. Stretching our 
metaphors a bit, we could say that what we are dealing with here is not really the 
height of rhetoric, but its depth. 
I do not think that this closes the curious case of the elevated rhetoric. Th ere are 
still two factors that have not been considered, the fi rst of which is the claim that 
the main problem of the third logical branch is “the infl uence of one thought upon 
another thought” (see quote above). Th is is certainly reminiscent of the early defi nition 
of formal rhetoric as a study of the force or power of symbols; yet, it involves a small 
but arguably signifi cant shift  in focus that is easy to miss. Th is principal question of 
rhetoric is not characterized in terms of conditions aff ecting the symbol merely, but of 
the process in general (or, to use later terminology, of mental semiosis). Accordingly, 
Peirce defi nes speculative rhetoric as “the study of the necessary conditions of the 
transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to 
another” (CP 1.444, c. 1896). In somewhat more general terms, the task of the third 
branch is specifi ed as the ascertainment of “the laws by which in every scientifi c 
intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth 
another” (CP 2.229, c. 1897). 
Th is brings us to another intriguing aspect of Peirce’s discussions of speculative 
rhetoric in the 1890s. In several characterizations of its fi eld and tasks, he states that 
philosophical rhetoric is tantamount to, or at least nearly synonymous with, something 
that he calls “objective logic” (CP 1.444, c. 1896; CP 3.430, 1896; cf. MS 839).10 Peirce 
10 ‘Formal rhetoric’ (pub. 20.05.15–20:19). Quote in Bergman, Mats; Paavola, Sami (eds.), Th e 
Commens Dictionary: Peirce’s Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://
www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-fragments-r.
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is acutely aware of the negative connotations of the term (see, e.g., MS 915); yet, he 
maintains that it “conveys the correct idea that [speculative rhetoric] is like Hegel’s 
logic” (CP 1.444). It is almost as if the use of the term “rhetoric” were not controversial 
enough.11 Evidently, the Kantian advocate of exact logic also wishes to link its third 
branch with a Hegelian logic of evolution.12
Hypothesis II: Evolutionary developments
To understand what Peirce’s rather cryptic references to objective logic may entail, we 
fi rst need to take a step or two back. In an 1895 letter to F. C. Russell, Peirce mentions 
abandoned plans for an article dealing with a branch of philosophy that he variously 
calls “Second Intentional Logic, Objective Logic, & Pure Rhetoric”, and which he then 
summarizes as “the doctrine of the Evolution of thought” (MS L387, Oct 4; W 8: xcv). 
Th e essay in question would have been the 6th installation – and purportedly the 
“the Keystone of the whole” – in his well-known metaphysical or cosmogonic series, 
published in Th e Monist between 1891 and 1893. Th is might suggest synechism (cf. CP 
8.257, 1902), but given that this “tendency to regard everything as continuous” (EP 
2: 1, 1893) is dealt with in the third article, it seems unlikely that the pivotal upshot 
would have been a mere repetition of the synechistic credo. Rather, the gist of the 
climax would most likely have been an account of a generalized theory of evolution 
under the heading of objective logic.
Th e extant metaphysical series off ers only some suggestions of what might have 
been. In the articles, there is no explicit mention of rhetoric or second-intentional 
logic. However, in “Th e law of mind” (1892), Peirce does sketch a broadly idealistic 
conception of communication that may provide some indications of what the rhetorical 
outcome of the fi nal piece could have been (see W 8: 155–156); and in “Th e doctrine 
of necessity examined” (1891), we do fi nd a relevant reference to objective logic. 
I make use of chance chiefl y to make room for a principle of generalization, 
or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities. Th e 
mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specifi cation of the world utterly 
11 In a somewhat contrarian fashion, Peirce avers that for him personally, the term “rhetoric 
[...] gives that sort of satisfaction which so many schools have manifested in adopting 
appellations invented by their opponents as depreciative” (CP 2.333, c. 1895–1896).
12 Here, I restrict myself to Peirce’s sparse comments on Hegelian logic in relation to the 
reconception of the trivium. A fuller account of these developments would require a closer 
look at how Hegel actually comprehends the relationship between objective and subjective 
logic in addition to a host of other complex issues; but for now, I will simply ignore the question 
of whether Peirce’s interpretation is fair or not. Th e “Hegel” of this article is Peirce’s Hegel.
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unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance. 
I attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of a 
spontaneity which is to some degree regular. It seems to me clear at any rate that 
one of these two positions must be taken, or else specifi cation must be supposed 
due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain and not in a chance way, by 
an objective logic like that of Hegel. Th is last way I leave as an open possibility, for 
the present; for it is as much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as 
my own theory is. (W 8: 124–125)
Here, Peirce recognizes two major metaphysical alternatives: the mechanical or 
necessitarian view, which traces the specifi cation of the world back to the beginning 
of time and renders it and law ultimately inexplicable, and tychism, which attributes 
specifi cation to a partly regular spontaneity. Th is is rather vague, and Peirce ends up 
doing a better job in refuting necessitarian arguments than in explicating his own 
position. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he leaves the third, quasi-Hegelian 
option open. Th e important thing to note, however, is that objective logic has evidently 
not yet taken on the role proposed for it in the letter and in other writings to come.
Somewhat later, Peirce actually appears to be on the verge of closing the third path. In 
a draft  of “Evolutionary love” (1891–1892), he characterizes “development under a rule 
of logic” or “inward necessity” as a degenerate form of the “anancastic development of 
thought”, which “proceeds in a sort of Hegelian course” (i.e., dialectically), in contrast 
to genuine anancasm, which is “development under the infl uence of the external 
world” where habits are broken up by “the logic of events” (W 8: 415).13 Th us, with 
Hegelian development reckoned to be a mode of evolution by mechanical necessity, 
it seems fair to assume that whatever Peirce has in mind when affi  rming a kind of 
objective logic, it is not precisely like Hegel’s logic, aft er all. 
Th e fi rst defi nite indication that Peirce actually has embraced some version of 
the Hegelian option is found in the prospectus for the never-completed Principles of 
Philosophy (c. 1893), where he claims to have uncovered an objective logic that follows 
from “the philosophy of continuity” (i.e., from synechism). Not much is said about the 
contents of this new doctrine, except that its movement diff ers from Hegel’s dialectic. 
In a letter dealing with his prospective Th e Art of Reasoning, Peirce suggests the need 
for a separate volume on second-intentional logic, where he would show that it really 
amounts to an objective or material logic – “something like Hegel’s logic, one idea 
developing into another”, but with Hegelian dialectic treated as a particular case of a 
13 In the published article, basically the same distinction is introduced without reference to 
Hegel or the logic of events: “Th e anancastic development of thought will consist of new ideas 
adopted without foreseeing whither they tend, but having a character determined by causes 
either external to the mind, such as changed circumstances of life, or internal to the mind as 
logical developments of ideas already accepted, such as generalizations” (W8: 196, 1892).
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more general formula (MS L387, p. 15 [Sep 5, 1894]; cf. MS L387 [Sep 28, 1896]).14 In 
the same letter, Peirce puts forward a plan for a fi rst volume on necessary reasoning, 
where, in a division designated as “Methodology”, one also fi nds a chapter on “Formal 
grammar and formal rhetoric”, which Peirce claims to be “nearly ready”.15 Note, 
however, that there is at this point no overt indication that rhetorical investigation 
would have anything to do with objective logic. Nor is the connection made in the 
roughly contemporaneous manuscript chapter on “Th e logic of quantity” (discussed 
above), where Peirce does make some use of his old conception of rhetoric, but without 
reference to either objective logic or second-intentional logic. 
Fragmentary as they are, these appear to be the fi rst concrete signals of the impending 
recovery of rhetoric. However, when one reviews the manifestations of rhetoric and 
objective logic in the fi rst half of the 1890s, it is the latter that at fi rst emerges as a genuinely 
innovatory point of view in Peirce’s philosophy. Consequently, when he does link rhetoric 
with objective logic in the 1895 letter, it does not amount to the introduction of just another 
name for the third branch;16 rather, this joining implies a rather substantial, albeit largely 
implicit, reconsideration of the role that the long-neglected fi eld of speculative rhetoric 
might yet play in his grand philosophical vision. In the same context, Peirce fi nally reveals 
the “true formula” of objective logic, of which Hegel’s dialectic, generalization, and the 
formation of systems in the logic of relatives17 are purportedly degenerate forms: it is the 
attraction between ideas, or the power of evolutionary love (MS L387, Oct 4, 1895). In 
other words, as objective logic, rhetoric has been transformed into a logic of development – 
or, perhaps more accurately, into something harbouring the promise of the formation of 
such a theory. In view of its modest beginnings as the poor sibling of logic proper, this 
is in any case a remarkable makeover.
14  In a chapter apparently intended for Th e Grand Logic, Peirce identifi es objective logic with 
second-intentional logic, but the ensuing formal discussion does not clarify how it is meant to 
amount to a logic of development – if, indeed, it is even supposed to do so (see CP 4.80–84, c. 
1893–1894). Beverley Kent (1977: 142) views this as a distinct use of the term ‘objective logic’, 
and contends that second-intentional objective logic is actually a mathematical study. In fact, her 
rationale would render all formal logic a part of mathematics, which is debatable (but see CP 4.240, 
1902; and see also MS 950, where Peirce appears to associate objective logic with mathematics).
15  It is unclear to what manuscript Peirce might be referring, or if the chapter actually ever 
existed in any form. Th e table of contents (MS 399), which has been published in Vol. 8 of the 
Collected Papers, largely follows the plan laid out in the letter to Russell, but it does not mention 
a chapter on grammar and rhetoric.
16  For this error, see e.g. Bergman 2009: 174.
17  In the 1898 lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Th ings, Peirce explains the logical 
signifi cance of this notion of ‘system’ by specifying that “in place of the class, – which is 
composed of a number of individual objects or facts brought together in ordinary logic by 
means of their relation of similarity, the logic of relatives considers the system, which is com-
posed of objects brought together by any kind of relations whatsoever” (RLT 146; cf. CP 4.5).
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Th is, then, is the answer I am proposing: it is the objective-logical infl uence on 
speculative rhetoric – or, more potently, the envisaged reformation of philosophical 
rhetoric as objective logic – that best explains Peirce’s claim that the third branch would 
be the highest of the divisions of logic. Th is does not mean that other elements, such 
as the new scientifi c functions assigned to rhetoric, could not also have been factors 
infl uencing his judgement; but a closer look at his references to the development of 
scientifi c representation show that they are largely in harmony with – or specifi cations 
of – the tenet that speculative rhetoric would be a study of the evolution of thought 
and signs.
Admittedly, Peirce never puts matters in exactly these terms, at least not to my 
knowledge. But the timing is just right; it is almost immediately aft er the linking of 
rhetoric with objective logic that the third branch is characterized as the uppermost 
department of logical inquiry. Th e subtle changes in Peirce’s characterizations of 
rhetoric, with its growing emphasis on conditions of transmission and rational 
development, are arguably upshots of the objective-logical stimulus. Of course, this 
does not mean that the union of speculative rhetoric and objective logic necessarily 
lives up to this promise. Perhaps the strongest counterargument to my explanation of 
the elevation of rhetoric – and, more generally, to the notion that Peirce would have 
meant anything serious by his talk about the “highest branch” – is that he does not 
really endeavour to expand rhetoric into a “colossal doctrine”. If the change truly is as 
consequential as I have suggested, should there not be at least some traces of attempts 
to reach for the anticipated “important philosophical conclusions”? 
I would argue that there are, but they are not necessarily found under the banner 
of rhetoric. Th e place to look is the “logic of events” that Peirce proposes to work out 
as the central part of a comprehensive objective logic in 1897–1898. In the main part of 
what has been preserved of this undertaking – the lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of 
Th ings – this is largely implicit, if not buried. In fact, the very name – a “logic of things” 
in place of a “logic of events” – suggests the curbing of aspirations in the delivered series. 
Responding to William James’s suggestion that the topic be cosmogony, Peirce’s original 
plan had been to talk on “tychism & synechism, but regarded from the point of view of 
Objective Logic” (letter to James, Dec 13, 1897). However, discouraged by James, who 
recoiled at the mathematico-logical character of some of the proposed talks, Peirce settled 
for a less ambitious arrangement. In fact, one needs to look quite hard to fi nd references 
to objective logic and rhetoric in the 1898 lectures. Without being identifi ed by name, 
speculative rhetoric is defi ned once – as a branch of logic that studies the conditions of 
signs “transferring their meaning to other signs” (RLT 146) – but about objective logic 
we actually only learn that all of the original eight lectures would have been concerned 
with that branch of philosophy (RLT 108). Still, reading between the lines, it is not 
too diffi  cult to detect objective-logical concerns and perspectives permeating certain 
discussions dealing with the logic of continuity and the logic of events. 
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Of the more systematic fi rst version of these lectures, only outlines, abstracts, and 
sketches remain. A full reconstruction would be challenging indeed, and is beyond 
the scope and needs of this essay. Most of the extant materials are parts of what would 
have been a fi nal lecture on “creation”, or the very fi rst stages of evolution; and much 
of what has survived could be described as sporadic fl ashes of light “relieved against 
Cimmerian darkness” [to paraphrase James’s (1907: 5) characterization of Peirce’s 
1903 Lowell lectures]. No doubt, a complete account of Peirce’s objective logic of events 
would need to include an examination of his theory of continuity, and of a host of 
other complex issues as well. Still, a couple of detached remarks on the character of 
the objective logic of 1897–1898 may be ventured here for the sake of illuminating 
certain implications and complications of the proposed hypothesis.
Perhaps most signifi cantly, the notes for the abandoned lectures provide some 
information about how Peirce thought that his objective logic diff ered from Hegel’s 
better-known doctrine. Peirce summarizes the latter as the thesis that “the whole 
universe and every feature of it, however minute, is rational, and was constrained 
to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of action in the 
universe but reason” (CP 6.218, 1897–1898). If one compares this to the conception of 
anancastic evolution mentioned above, it looks like Hegelian evolution collapses the 
distinction between genuine and degenerate anancasm into one, in eff ect rendering the 
development of the world as a comprehensive process of necessitated rationalization. 
What Peirce really objects to in this notion is not the idea of all-inclusive rational 
progress, but the rationalistic determinism inherent in an absolutistic view of the 
objective process. 
It is true that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded as 
rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that 
it is constrained to be as it is by the logic of events; for the logic of evolution and 
of life need not be supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely constrains 
a given conclusion. Th e logic may be that of the inductive or hypothetic inference. 
(CP 6.218, 1897–1898) 
In the place of necessitarianism, whether mechanical or Hegelian, Peirce off ers his 
own all-inclusive vision of development. As most of the surviving bits and pieces 
treat logical creation, his story begins in a time before time, setting out from an 
initial condition of “nothing, pure zero”, which is not the “nothing of negation” but 
a “germinal nothing” in which the whole universe is “involved or foreshadowed” 
(CP 6.217, 1897–1898). It is a state of infi nite possibility or freedom; yet, somehow 
underpinning it all is a key synechistic principle, according to which the putative 
starting point of “the bare Nothing of Possibility” would logically lead to continuity 
(NEM 4: 127, 1897–1898). Prompted by a veritable “big bang” of hypothetical inference – 
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a leap from the zero of possibility to the unit of some quality (CP 6.220, 1897–1898) – 
a logically subsequent, but fully arbitrary selection among qualitative possibilities 
occurs (cf. NEM 4: 135, 1897–8; RLT 260, 1898). By a movement that Peirce clearly 
fi nds diffi  cult to explicate in words,18 the dualistic accidents of reaction are united in a 
continuum and are thereby generalized (NEM 4: 137, 1897–1898). Here, we would seem 
to have a basic categorial progression of one-quality, two-reaction, three-generality. 
Yet, Peirce claims that his attempts to develop something like a Hegelian encyclopaedia 
by following the given numerical order have been failures, and he asserts that in the 
“true logic of events”, “the second does not spring out from the fi rst directly; but 
fi rstness looked at from a second point of view gives birth to a thirdness and the 
secondness comes out of the thirdness” (MS 943: 1, 1897–1898). 
Peirce’s evolutionism is truly exhaustive; he insists that development aff ects even 
the world of real possibility, of which our particular universe of existence is only 
one prospective determination. Time and logic itself purportedly arise from the 
evolution of the “Platonic world” (RLT 260, 1898).19 Th e introduction of existence, 
time, and logic takes us from the strictly logical part of the Hegelian Enzyklopädie to 
a Naturphilosophie (NEM 4: 138, 1897–1898). Behind it all lies a broadly teleological 
worldview, perhaps somewhat obscured by Peirce’s emphasis on creation. In what one 
might call the natural phase, the logical movement of thought basically manifests 
itself as a drive toward habitualization, with the tendency to take habits identifi ed as 
the fi rst and most pervasive law of nature (NEM 4: 140, 1897–1898). Still, highlighting 
another point where his evolutionism purportedly diverges from absolute idealism, 
18  In several of his descriptions of the most abstract logic of events, Peirce breaks off  his 
account at this point. Having done just that in the 1898 lecture on the logic of continuity, he 
confesses that what he has just said about the beginnings of creation seems “mildly confused 
enough” (RLT 261), and then attempts to explicate his contention with the help of a simple 
diagrammatic illustration of habits (structured diagrams) forming from chance occurrences 
(lines) on a space of possibilities (a blackboard). Th e procedure bears some resemblance to the 
previously described rhetorical example of the mathematician adding lines to an apparently 
disorderly graph in order to reveal its inherent potential; but here Peirce portrays this method 
as a universal process of development or determination. 
19  Th is is one of the most vexing points of Peirce’s comprehensive objective logic: how can one 
describe a non-temporal logic “before” logic from the restricted perspective of one’s existence? 
His indirect reply invokes the natural light thesis, bolstered with a nod to the economy of research. 
Arguing fi rst that there is simply no point in assuming that the objective logic of the world would 
be radically diff erent from our subjective logic, Peirce advocates the hypothesis that “the logic of 
the universe is one to which our own aspires, rather than attains” (RLT 257–258, 1898). Still, he 
sometimes portrays this teleological end in broadly religious terms, with the universe virtually 
destined “to become a more and more perfect mirror of that system of ideas which would result 
from the indefi nitely continued action of objective logic” (NEM 4: xxiv). 
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Peirce emphasises that habits, as such, do not produce development; for that, some 
kind of brute force – reaction, experience, catastrophe – is needed. It opens up a space 
in which a habit of changing habits can be formed (NEM 4: 142, 1897–1898). From 
this perspective, the objective logic of nature – now explicitly branded as an idealistic 
position – is then defi ned as “the doctrine that nothing exists but phenomena and what 
phenomena bring along with them and force upon us, that is Experience, including 
the reactions that experience feels and all that logically follows from experience by 
Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis” (NEM 4: 144, 1897–1898). It is not limited 
to human thought; but the evolution of the universe itself is presumed to advance in 
accordance with a logic so closely analogous to human reasoning that one can say that 
nature is making inferences or even “syllogizing” (RLT 161, 1898). 
Th ese are undeniably heady claims. Here, objective logic fuses into objective 
idealism, tying together some wayward strands from Peirce’s cosmogony of the early 
1890s with his theory of categories. It could justly be described as “a colossal doctrine 
which may be expected to lead to most important philosophical conclusions”, thus 
adding support to the hypothesis that it is as objective logic that speculative rhetoric 
reaches the highest strata of the world of logic. 
However, at the same time it must be conceded that this is not how Peirce presents 
matters in his objective logic of events of 1897–1898. In fact, this endeavour appears 
to be seeking its place in his conception of scientifi c inquiry; in addition to its 
presumed home in logic, it is sometimes associated with mathematics (MS 915) as 
well as with metaphysics (CP 6.214, 1897–1898). It is not clear whether the “birth” 
of time/existence splits objective logic into two parts: a purely logical (or perhaps 
mathematical) investigation of the quasi-inferential “movement” of the Platonic world 
and a natural-metaphysical investigation of the existential-temporal logic of events 
governing this world of existence. In many of Peirce’s refl ections on creation, objective 
logic actually moves so close to metaphysics that the two are practically inseparable. 
In this apparent encroachment of logic on the territory of metaphysics, one can 
perhaps detect traces of Hegel’s (2010[1813–1832]: 42) contention that objective logic 
takes the place “of the former metaphysics which was supposed to be the scientifi c 
edifi ce of the world as constructed by thoughts alone”. Admittedly, Peirce does not 
exactly advocate such a replacement, and he also criticizes Hegel’s scheme for its 
confi nement to internal thought-determination. However, the latter’s conception of an 
objective logic that in eff ect supersedes the old fi rst philosophy and precedes subjective 
logic (i.e., logic in a more traditional sense) may well be lurking in the background 
of the promotion of the third branch, like an unacknowledged “Hegelian bacillus” of 
sorts. Th ese are mere conjectures, of course; but the fact remains that the push and 
pull of Peirce’s objective logic of events is toward metaphysical matters. Th us, in spite 
of the professed fusion of rhetoric and objective logic, what Peirce actually writes on 
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the latter has generally – and understandably – been treated as metaphysics. Where 
all this fi nally leaves the highest branch of logic is a good question.20
Lowered expectations and new purposes
Th e contention that the identifi cation of speculative rhetoric with objective logic 
may explain Peirce’s elevation of the third branch to unforeseen heights does not 
entail that the straightforward union of the two is tenable. In fact, the fi rst signs of 
a breakup can be detected in 1898, that is, the very same year that Peirce presents a 
fragment of his grand vision in the Reasoning and the Logic of Th ings lectures. In a 
notebook entry dated September 29, he sketches a new conception of the trivium, in 
which speculative rhetoric is assigned the tasks of (1) methodology, (2) applications 
of logic to mathematics (etc.), and (3) objective logic. In spite of its terseness, this note 
is quite revealing, as this is probably the fi rst time that Peirce plainly designates the 
development of methods as a specifi cally rhetorical task. Also, there is an emphasis 
on application that harks back to ideas suggested in “Th e logic of quantity” and the 
Short Logic. However, given present concerns, it is the positioning of objective logic 
as a part of rhetoric that is perhaps the most telling feature of this conception. No 
longer synonymous with rhetoric, objective logic is now a subdivision in a branch of 
logic on the verge of a makeover.
Th e coming transformation is actually heralded by a minor remark in the notebook 
entry, where Peirce expresses some dissatisfaction with the name ‘speculative rhetoric’. 
Th e actual change takes place a couple of years later. In Th e Minute Logic, Peirce 
introduces ‘methodeutic’ as a near-synonym of ‘speculative rhetoric’ (CP 2.93, 1902); 
but in his slightly later application to the Carnegie Institution, only the former is 
20 An anonymous reviewer of this essay has suggested that there may be a signifi cant 
connection between the Hegelian notion of logic as a re-tracing of dialectical movements 
among ideas and a Peircean conception of rhetoric as an investigation of how critically justifi ed 
or truth-preserving scientifi c propositions and arguments can be combined in an objective 
system. Th is proposal, which might keep rhetoric cum objective logic within the disciplinary 
parameters of the trivium, deserves to be explored in more detail. It seems fairly obvious to 
me that the Peirce of the 1890s recognized at least a kinship between the dynamics of Hegel’s 
logic and his own 1867 conception of rhetoric as a study of the “force of symbols”, even if this 
infl uence must be qualifi ed by Peirce’s generally negative assessment of Hegelian dialectics. 
However, the question is whether Peirce’s expansive objective logic can plausibly be contained 
within the slot between critic and metaphysics. As it is construed in terms of the logic of events, 
Peircean objective logic seems on the one hand to have very little, if any, grounding in the 
justifi cations provided by logical critic, while on the other spilling over into territories thought 
to belong to metaphysics. 
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employed. Th is entails more than a nominal variation of words. As the new name 
suggests, the third branch of logic is now increasingly focused on methods of inquiry. 
Although Peirce returns to ‘speculative rhetoric’ on a couple of occasions, it is evident 
that ‘methodeutic’ – understood as a study of “the methods that ought to be pursued in 
the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth” (EP 2: 260, 1903) or 
simply as a branch that “should investigate the general principles upon which scientifi c 
studies should be carried on” (MS 1334: 28, 1905) – is the preferred appellation and 
point of view. 
In the background, one can discern a new emphasis on the normativity of logic. 
Although anticipated by some earlier observations (e.g., MS 594, 189321), it is only 
in the 1900s that Peirce begins to portray logic as a fully normative discipline. Th is 
also aff ects the third branch, something that is evident in the emphases on what 
should and ought to be done in the characterizations of methodeutic given above. 
Accompanying this, one fi nds an accent on ends and purposes – anticipated in the 
Short Logic – creeping into the more semiotic depictions of the third branch. Th us, 
Th e Minute Logic characterizes rhetoric as “the doctrine of the general conditions 
of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to 
determine” (CP 2.93, 1902); while the Carnegie application defi nes methodeutic in 
terms of the conditions to which a sign must conform in order to be pertinent to “the 
purposed ultimate interpretant” (NEM 4: 62, 1902). 
From a somewhat diff erent perspective, the primary focus on method also seems 
to call for a general theory of purposive or normative action.
Nowadays methods alone can arrest attention strongly; and these are coming 
in such fl ocks that the next step will surely be to fi nd a method of discovering 
methods. Th is can only come from a theory of the method of discovery. In order to 
cover every possibility, this should be founded on a general doctrine of methods 
of attaining purposes, in general; and this, in turn, should spring from a still more 
general doctrine of the nature of teleological action, in general. (CP 2.108, 1902)
Given that the logic of events has been characterized as a theory of evolution or 
development of mind with distinct teleological undertones, this generalization of 
the foci of methodeutic might be construed as a pointer toward objective logic in the 
sense of the 1890s; but such a correlation is not established. So what, then, becomes of 
objective logic aft er this proverbial purposive turn? In both Th e Minute Logic and the 
Carnegie application, there are in fact sections dealing with objective logic, but it is 
treated somewhat diff erently than before. In Th e Minute Logic, Peirce seems to suggest 
21 ‘Logic’ (pub. 24.08.15–13:22). Quote in Bergman, Mats; Paavola, Sami (eds.), Th e Commens 
Dictionary: Peirce’s Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://www.
commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-search-method-fragments-r.
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that objective logic is something to be pursued aft er speculative rhetoric – the last part 
of normative semiotic – has been brought to a close (CP 2.111, 1902; cf. Fisch 1986: 273; 
Kent 1977). Objective logic is now characterized as a subsequent endeavour focused 
on the question of the “life of signs”. However, it is unclear whether it is intended to 
respond to the need for a general theory of teleological action, as Peirce at least seems 
to assert that such a doctrine would precede rhetoric in the order of inquiry. It may 
actually refer to normative ethics.  
On the other hand, one can discern an increased attention to goal-directedness 
in Peirce’s portrayals of the procedure of objective logic. By a material application of 
the universal categories as well as direct use of the pragmatic maxim, it is expected to 
elucidate the “three modes or factors of being” imperfectly manifested in metaphysical 
conceptions, and to clarify their role as “elements of coöperation toward the summum 
bonum” (CP 2.118, 1902). On this basis, a Weltanschauung that would cast new light not 
only on metaphysics, but also on the signifi cance of logic and ethics, is supposed to be 
built. Th us, objective logic appears to approach something like a general ontology, but 
with implications extending above rhetoric/methodeutic; Peirce leaves the question 
hanging. Th e objective-logical pursuit is perhaps not precisely normative; but neither 
is it defi nitely classifi ed as metaphysics.
In the Carnegie application, Peirce proposes to devote a whole memoir to the 
topic of objective logic, and places the tome (never produced, of course) between 
methodeutic and metaphysics, but in a way that suggests that it is still closer to the 
former than to the latter (NEM 4: 31, 1902). Here, as in Th e Minute Logic, some new 
emphases and aims emerge. More clearly than before, objective logic is now supposed 
to be concerned with the investigation of the manifestations of the “modes of being” – 
that is, the particular or material categories – a more modest undertaking than the 
explication of a comprehensive logic of development. However, the main task of 
objective logic is purportedly to show “that ideas really infl uence the physical world, 
and in doing so carry their logic with them” (NEM 4: 31, 1902). Th is exposition of “the 
logic of ideas in their physical agency” encompasses the examination of two modes 
of indispensable modes of causation – effi  cient and fi nal – as well as the refutation of 
absolute idealism, psycho-physical parallelism, and materialism as theories of mind. 
Teleological action is clearly a primary concern of objective logic, but perhaps more 
in a descriptive than in a prescriptive sense.
In one draft  for the Carnegie application, Peirce expresses dome doubts that ‘logic’ 
is really the appropriate heading for this endeavour (MS L75d: 387). Th is may have 
been caused by the realization that his conception of objective logic could hardly be 
characterized as a strictly normative science – namely, as a department of inquiry 
that “studies what ought to be” (CP 1.281, 1902). While objective logic seems to be 
involved with the other aspect of normative investigation – that is, “the analysis of the 
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conditions of attainment of something of which purpose is an essential ingredient” 
(CP 1.575, 1902) – it nonetheless lacks that key element of a fundamental dualistic 
distinction that distinguishes a prescriptive discipline from others (cf. EP 2: 259, 1903). 
As objective logic passes “beyond pure logic” (MS L75d: 382, 1902), its disciplinary 
status becomes highly uncertain. On the one hand, it seems to hover in a scientifi c no 
man’s land between logic and metaphysics. On the other, it is unclear whether objective 
logic really can be described as a discipline or sub-discipline anymore. Rather, it may 
be taken to denote a fi eld of inquiry – “the logical processes of ideas acting upon the 
external world” (MS L75d: 387, 1902) – or even a worldview. In this last respect, it 
may have a substantial connection to the suggested “general doctrine of the nature 
of teleological action” aft er all.
If this is indeed the case, then it is not all that surprising that objective logic 
basically disappears from Peirce’s increasingly compartmentalized models of scientifi c 
inquiry aft er 1902. Being no longer simply identical with rhetoric/methodeutic, nor 
a subdivision or an off shoot thereof, objective logic is quietly dismissed from the 
organized sciences. However, that does not mean that the pursuits that Peirce has 
been articulating under this banner also fade into oblivion. In some respects, the 
opposite is true, with interests and perspectives of the virtually abandoned discipline 
resurfacing in diff erent guises in phaneroscopy, in esthetics, in ethics, in metaphysics, 
and perhaps even in formal logic. 
Peirce’s last forays into rhetoric provide a pertinent illustration of this claim. 
In “Ideas, stray or stolen, about scientifi c writing” (1904), he defi nes speculative 
rhetoric as “the science of the essential conditions under which a sign may determine 
an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it signifi es, or may, as a sign, bring 
about a physical result” (EP 2: 326). Th is emphasis on general ideas producing 
“stupendous physical eff ects”, as well as the new rhetorical thesis that “ideas cannot 
be communicated at all except through their physical eff ects” (EP 2: 326), are arguably 
outcomes of the later objective-logical considerations. More boldly, I would argue that 
the gist of the Weltanschauung of objective logic lives on in the celebrated defi nition of 
semiosis as a “tri-relative infl uence” that is explicitly distinguished from mechanical 
action (EP 2: 411, 1907). But that is a topic for another speculation.
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Высшая ветвь логики? 
Об одном забытом вопросе спекулятивной риторики
Ч. С. Пирс охарактеризовал философскую риторику как “высшую и наиживейшую 
часть логики”. В статье дается новая трактовка причин, вызвавших такое неожиданное 
возвышение третьего подраздела семиотики (которая понимается как логика в широком 
смысле слова), и рассматриваются некоторые импликации этой новой интерпретации. 
Предлагаются два вероятных объяснения, которые указывают на столь же удивительное 
связывание Пирсом риторики и объективной логики в 1890-х годах. В последней 
части статьи поднимается вопрос о том, каким образом переход Пирса из риторики в 
методевтику мог повлиять на его концепцию логики. 
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Loogika kõrgeim haru? 
Spekulatiivse retoorika ühest unarussejäetud küsimusest
C. S. Peirce iseloomustas fi losoofi list retoorikat kui “loogika kõrgeimat ja elusaimat haru”. 
Artiklis visandatakse uus tõlgendus sellele, mis põhjustas semiootika (mida mõistetakse 
loogikana laias tähenduses) kolmanda alajaotuse sellise ootamatu esiletõstmise, ning 
vaadeldakse väljapakutava tõlgenduse mõningaid järeldusi. Tuvastatakse kaks usutavat seletust, 
mis toovad nähtavale Peirce’i samavõrra üllatusliku seoseloomise retoorika ja objektiivse 
loogika vahel 1890. aastatel. Viimases osas puudutatakse põgusalt küsimust, kuidas Peirce’i 
hilisem nihkumine retoorikast metodeutikasse võis mõjutada tema loogikakontseptsiooni.
